Even shorter than the case "briefs" I've been posting, these summaries - lifted straight from appeals documents - allow me to cover even more cases. Each summary will include a link to the relevant brief or document for anyone interested in reading more. My insertions are in italics.
Case: State v Cordero D. Coleman
Case no. 23AP2414
Filed in: District IV Court of Appeals
Trial judge: Dane County Circuit Judge John D. Hyland
Filing attorney: Assistant State Public Defender Leo Draws
Issues presented
1. Nearly three years elapsed between the charge against Cordero Coleman and the resolution of the case via a jury trial. Did this protracted delay deprive Mr. Coleman of his constitutional right to a speedy trial?
2. Trial counsel failed to assert Mr. Coleman’s constitutional right to a speedy trial and did not advise Mr. Coleman of that right. The sole remedy for such a violation of Mr. Coleman’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is dismissal with prejudice, but trial counsel failed to take any action enforcing that right. Did this render trial counsel ineffective?
Statement of the case and facts
First, the overview of the case is as follows. On June 14, 2019, the state charged Mr. Coleman with repeated sexual assault of a child. The complaint alleged that on or between January 1, 2019 and June 1, 2019, Mr. Coleman committed at least three assaults of MAJ.
On June 25, 2019, Attorney Jason Gonzalez was appointed to represent Mr. Coleman. Attorney Gonzalez would represent Mr. Coleman throughout the case.
While Mr. Coleman posted bond shortly after being charged, the first nine months of proceedings saw jury trial dates scheduled and then rescheduled — from January 6-8, 2020 until April. This initial delay pushed the case into the unprecedented era of Covid delays and the temporary suspension of jury trials.
From July 23, 2019 until March 8, 2021, not a single substantive hearing took place in the case. On March 8, 2021, the circuit court conducted a brief hearing at which it determined that Mr. Coleman no longer needed to participate in pretrial GPS services in light of his compliance with bond conditions over the long period of time.
For almost an entire year after that hearing, there was not a single on-the-record hearing in Mr. Coleman’s case. Nearly three years after charges were filed, the case proceeded to a jury trial, from February 7-9, 2022.
***
After the state had already rested its case, Attorney Gonzalez complained that the court system in Dane County stayed shut down longer than that of other counties and that the delays had violated Mr. Coleman’s speedy trial rights, with the resulting prejudice rendering Brenda Tompkins (a key defense witness who died about five months before trial) unavailable. Attorney Gonzalez further stated that he did not file a speedy trial demand or any motion related to speedy trial rights even though Mr. Coleman’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The state responded by stating that defense counsel did not object to any of the requested adjournments throughout the course of the proceedings. Ultimately, the circuit court did not allow the defense to present any testimony about what (the potential witness) would have stated.
The jury found Mr. Coleman guilty, and the circuit court sentenced him to 32 years, consisting of a 25-year period of confinement and a 7-year term of extended supervision.
In postconviction proceedings, Mr. Coleman asked the court to reverse his conviction and have the case dismissed with prejudice. In particular, Mr. Coleman argued that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by the three-year delay between charging and the jury trial. Alternatively, Mr. Coleman argued for the same relief in light of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to assert the right. During postconviction litigation, Attorney Gonzalez made it clear that he had never contemplated or discussed raising a claim regarding the violation of Mr. Coleman’s constitutional speedy trial rights. Mr. Coleman also stated that he wanted to go to trial as soon as possible and that had Attorney Gonzalez discussed that right with him, Mr. Coleman would have wanted to pursue it. Following a Machner hearing and a round of briefing, the circuit court denied Mr. Coleman’s postconviction motion. Specifically, the circuit court held that Mr. Coleman was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The circuit court also held that Attorney Gonzalez was not ineffective because it would have denied a motion for dismissal of the criminal action on speedy trial grounds had such a motion been filed.
This appeal follows.
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