Even shorter than the case "briefs" I've been posting, these summaries - lifted straight from appeals documents - allow me to cover even more cases. Each summary will include a link to the relevant brief or document for anyone interested in reading more. My insertions are in italics.
The case: Jeffery A. LeMieux and David T. DeValk v. Governor Tony Evers, Secretary of State Sarah Godlewski, and Superintendent of Public Instruction Jill Underly
Case no.: 24AP729
Filed in: Wisconsin Supreme Court, petition for original action
Attorneys: Scott Rosenow and Nathan Kane, Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce (WMC) Litigation Center
Issues
Does Article V, § 10(1)(c) of the Wisconsin Constitution forbid a governor from deleting digits in an enrolled bill to create a new year? That section reads, "In approving an appropriation bill in part, the governor may not create a new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill, and may not create a new sentence by combining parts of two or more sentences of the enrolled bill.
Does a governor exceed his or her partial-veto authority under Article V, § 10(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Constitution by deleting language in an enrolled bill to create a longer duration than the one that the legislature approved?
That section reads, "If the governor approves and signs the bill, the bill shall become law. Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the governor, and the part approved shall become law."
Introduction
Wisconsin school districts may increase their revenue multiple ways. Voters may approve a referendum to exceed their district’s revenue limit. The legislature may also increase that revenue limit because it is statutory — and school districts may then raise revenue up to that new limit without needing voter approval.
In the 2023–2025 biennium budget bill, the Wisconsin Legislature approved a two-year increase of the school district revenue limit. Governor Tony Evers used a partial veto, however, to add 400 years to that two-year increase.
This partial veto is profoundly undemocratic. Besides harnessing lawmaking power vested in the legislature, this partial veto deprived Wisconsin voters of their ability to decide via referendum whether to allow their respective school district to increase their property taxes for 400 years. ...
Not only undemocratic, this partial veto violates the Wisconsin Constitution for two separate reasons. (Grammar, people!)
First, this partial veto violates Article V, § 10(1)(c) of the Wisconsin Constitution.
As approved by voters in 1990, this clause “prohibits the governor from ‘creat[ing] a new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill.’” The “pick-a-letter veto” is “the selective vetoing of letters to form a new word, or of digits to form a new number.” ...
More than 60 percent of Wisconsin voters approved it in an April 1990 referendum.
The 1990 amendment ... “keeps intact” the governor’s power to use the partial veto to reduce appropriations.
The partial veto at issue here is an unconstitutional “pick-a-letter” veto, not a reduction of an appropriation. It struck individual digits to create a new year four centuries further into the future. This partial veto thus violates Article V, § 10(1)(c).
This partial veto is unlawful for a second reason: it exceeds the governor’s authority under Article V, § 10(1)(b).
“To fall within the purview of powers authorized by Art. V., sec. 10(1)(b),” a partial veto must approve a “part” of an appropriation bill. ...
The partial veto at issue is not an approval of “part” of a bill.
As enrolled and presented to the Governor, the biennial budget bill authorized a school district revenue increase in the 2023–2024 and 2024–2025 academic years only.
This partial veto authorizes additional revenue increases beginning in the year 2025 through the year 2425.
The Governor’s 400-year increase of the revenue limit is not a “part” of the legislatively authorized two-year increase.
This Court should use its original jurisdiction to grant this petition and declare that this partial veto violates Article V, § 10(1)(b) and (c).
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